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Projective Artistic Design Making and Thinking:
the Artification of Design Research
  Stephen A. R. Scrivener & Su Zheng 
Abstract
Artification concerns the introduction of artistic ways of thinking
and doing into non-art domains, such as business, typically
because the host domain recognizes that art has something of
value to offer that it does not.  However, it is by no means easy
to establish exactly what it is that the art actually does offer.  In
this paper, we approach this question by examining problems
encountered in what might be called the “researchification” of
artistic design.  Following an historical and experiential account of
the problematic conjunction of artistic design and research, we
conclude that the projective making and thinking strategies of
artistic design offer something of value not only to the artification
of research but to artification in general.
Key Words
artistic problem-solving, projective making and thinking,
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1. Introduction
Ossi Naukkarinen uses the word artification to refer to “situations
and processes in which something that is not regarded as art in
the traditional sense of the word is changed into something art-
like or into something that takes influences from artistic ways of
thinking and acting.  It refers to processes where art becomes
mixed with something else and this something else adopts some
features of art.”[1]  One feature of this definition is that two
disciplines or practices come together because one sees
advantages in utilizing the potential that it recognizes in the
other.  In this paper, we explore the conjunction of the practices
of artistic design and research.  In contrast to artification,
however, this conjunction was not one of acceptance but of
resistance:  artistic designers found the “researchification” of
artistic design problematical.
We shall examine the origins and nature of this problematical
situation before describing in detail one successful artistic
research project that demonstrates how knowledge and
understanding can be achieved through artistic methods. 
Additionally, we argue that the project reveals the projective
dimension of artistic design thinking and making that, when
introduced into research, can be seen as an element of
artification.
Finally, we address Naukkarinen’s observation that advocates of
artification see art as providing “something other than what there
already is in the area or activity to be artified.”[2]  In the closing
sections of the text, we offer reasons why projective artistic
making and thinking can be understood as one kind of
“something else” that art has to offer to other professional fields.
2. The artification of research
In their introduction to this special issue of Contemporary
Aesthetics, Naukkarinen and Yuriko Saito quickly establish its
focus:  “situations and processes in which something that is not
regarded as art in the traditional sense of the word is changing
into something art-like or something that takes its influences
form artistic ways of thinking and practicing.”  In this paper, we
focus on what might be described as the artification of design
research.  However, in contrast to much of the literature
discussed by Naukkarinen, where specific fields, such as business,
appear to be strategically introducing artistic practices into their
own practices, here we will explore the conjunction of practices
from the opposite direction by examining what happens when art
in the academy has reasons for conjoining the practice of
research with the practice of art.  We might say that we will
address the researchification of art.  What we hope to show,
however, is that the challenge  of unravelling certain puzzles that
have emerged through our exploration will yield insight into
certain characteristics of the work of art and works of art[3] that
are recognized, perhaps tacitly, as strategically useful by those
fields that are open to artification.  In short, by understanding
why art is problematized by research, we can gain an
appreciation of what art has to offer to other fields of inquiry and
production.
It is perhaps not surprising to find that creativity is often at the
center of artification.  Naukkarinen notes that the intention of
artification often appears to be “to make companies more
creative.”  Naukkarinen enumerates a large number of features of
art that are seen by advocates of artification as being “something
other than what there already is in the area or activity to be
artified.”  Of these many possible additions that art can make to
another field, a number are reflected in our findings and can be
summarized as an ability to act without water-proof evidence in
situations demanding improvisation, where projective ways of
making could be substituted for methodological rigor.  
One final point to note before proceeding is that our paper
focuses on design, not art.  However, we would argue that while
art and design might have different functions, different ends,
different sociologies, and so on, each exhibits the characteristics
that we hope to illuminate below.  In what follows, when referring
to design that is seen as sharing features with art, we will use the
term artistic design.
3. From design to design research 
It is important to our story to appreciate that up to the late
twentieth century, design education in the United Kingdom
developed along two lines, one rooted in the analytical and
physical sciences and emerging out of engineering and
technology, and one aligned with the humanities and arising out
of art.  This difference between foundations, which also drove a
distance between their educational and productive trajectories,
was reinforced by the institutional structure of education and
research.  Prior to 1992, art-led design was mostly located within
independent colleges or polytechnic departments of art and
design, the latter in most cases resulting from the merger of pre-
existing art and design college with polytechnics.  In contrast,
engineering- and technology-led design was mostly located in
polytechnics and universities in non-artistic design departments. 
As a consequence, engineering- and technology-led design has a
tradition quite different from that of art-led or artistic design.
Within the engineering- and technology-driven field of design
education, a tradition of design research developed that sought to
emulate the knowledge production achievements of the physical
sciences.  “A desire to scientize design can be traced back to
ideas in the twentieth-century modern movement of design,”
Nigel Cross observed.[4]  Design Science is the extension of
scientific design to include the systematic knowledge of design
processes and methodology in addition to the scientific
underpinnings of the artifact, which is developed and refined
through design research projects, such as those described by
Nigan Bayazit.[5]
4. Practice-led design research 
While design research developed in engineering and technology
departments in the university, it rarely penetrated the art and
design schools in the polytechnic and independent colleges. 
Indeed, these institutions were not required or provided with
income to undertake research under United Kingdom science
policy.  However, in 1992, this binary divide was removed and
polytechnics were converted into universities.  Additionally, the
UK academic art and design world became entitled to research
funding, distributed via the Research Assessment Exercise and
the Arts and Humanities Research Council.
However, although research became a priority, the nature of that
research was by no means decided, and this uncertainty
stimulated an extended debate concerned with shaping research
to accommodate art and artistic design values.  Research
practices in a wide range of academic fields were examined and
found wanting.  What they lacked can be seen as encapsulated in
the notion of practice-based or practice-led research, which
Carole Gray defined as
firstly, research which is initiated in practice, where
questions, problems, challenges are identified and formed
by the needs of practice and practitioners; and secondly...
 the research strategy is carried out through practice,
predominantly methodologies and specific methods familiar
to us as practitioners in the visual arts.[6]
The debate within which this text is situated seeks to provide a
substantive role for art and design production and products in
research, and, by so doing, points to problems in determining the
relation between the practice of research and the practices of art
and design production.[7]
To summarize, most knowledge fields have established practices
focused on the production of new knowledge and understanding,
that is, research.  Engineering and technology design has also
established such practices, which draw upon the rational and
empirical traditions of the analytical and physical sciences.  The
research practices of many of these fields might be said to have
been inspected as potential sites of artification by members of the
fields of art and artistic design and found to be uninviting.  With
this as our background, we can now progress to a more concrete
exploration of problems that arose when artists and artistic
designers were invited to engage with a particular design
research practice, problem-solving design research.
5. Problem-solving design research 
Problem-solving design research usually begins with problematic
situations in the world that point to a problematic situation in
designing.  The problem is then critiqued in order to understand
how we might expand design to encompass its solution.  The
critique then leads to a proposal for a revised or new method of
designing.  For example, it might be observed that Web sites are
often unusable.  Investigation might reveal a lack of effective
usability evaluation methods for Web site evaluation and
redesign, thus encouraging research to develop, test, and
validate a new or enhanced way of designing (represented by the
red dot in Figure 1), in order to overcome the limitations of
current methods (represented by the lower, black circle in Figure
1). Testing is achieved by applying the method to design or
redesign an artifact (Figure 1, green dot), which is then tested to
ensure that it ameliorates or eradicates the observed problem,
thereby confirming the value of the new way of designing.
However, since a new or revised method has been produced, we
don’t just have a single solution:  the method predicts a set of
solutions.
 
Figure 1. The typical problem-solving design research process
The validated method stands as the contribution to knowledge,
and it is pretty easy to see how this kind of problem-solving
design research process satisfies the conditions of research.[8] 
Up to the present, much design research might be classed as
problem solving.
6. Artistic design research 
Scrivener[9] has described how his extensive experience in
shaping and delivering problem-solving design research projects
proved inconsistent with the interests of artistic designers.  As
noted earlier, problem-solving design research focuses primarily
on critique, design method, and testing.  Typically, designing is
involved only to produce an artifact using the proposed method
so as to test its efficacy; thus, designing and design products
play a relatively minor part in the overall research process. 
However, artistic researchers, who might be described as
practice-based, practice- or art-led, tend to be resistant to a
process that diminishes the role of designing and design products,
that is, the work of and works of design, in research.  Indeed, the
adjectives “practice-based,” “practice-led,” and “creative-
production” can be understood as signifying a tacit understanding
of the potential of the work and works of design as a means of
generating and communicating new understanding.  However, if
the use of these adjectives is to signify more than just an
attachment to habit, then we need to articulate more clearly the
potential of a research process that is led by the work of and
works of design, and what is actually meant by “led” in this
context.  In the following section, we will describe, analyze, and
interpret a particular artistic design research project to throw
light on what it means for a research project to be led by the
work and works of design; or, put another way, to be artified.
7. Narrating a creative-production design research project
    7.1 the project
The research project that we describe below concerned the design
of interactive exhibits that support children’s learning.  The first
achievement of this project was the production of a working
design prototype, called “Eye-jump.”[10]  At first sight, Eye-jump
looks like a normal skipping rope.  However, when it is used,
rotated light emitting diodes embedded in the transparent rope
are illuminated by display technology housed in the skipping rope
handles.
 a) The Eye-jump before skipping commences  
b)  Skipping reveals a lion image     
Figure 2. The Eye-jump prototype shown when a) static and b) rotated at
display velocity
This technology can be programmed to display images in a
manner rather like the cathode ray tube, where pixels are
individually illuminated in sweeping raster lines from the top to
the bottom of the screen.  Persistence of vision means that we
see a stable spatial and temporal image, rather than pixels
written out over time.  In the case of Eye-jump, the surface of
the screen is the part visible to the viewer of the sphere created
as the rope sweeps over the skipper’s head and under his or her
feet in constant rotation.  As the rope rotates, the rope diodes are
changed to display the next line of the image, until the whole
image has been presented.  This cycle is repeated for as long as
the skipper maintains the conditions for display.  For children and
adults, the behavior of this apparently familiar plaything, the
skipping rope, is surprising, and this surprise represents a rupture
in our understanding of the world, which encourages curiosity and
experimentation in order to adjust our understanding to
accommodate the surprising event.
To the researcher, the invention of Eye-jump also represented a
surprise, an unfamiliar but desirable product that needed to be
understood through its cognitive and behavioral effects and the
potential it offered for the design of related products.  The work
of understanding, which, for the most part, happened after the
creation of Eye-jump, led to a conceptual framework called the
Creativity Surprise Model (CSM), which established a motivational
relationship between a surprise event and the generation of
creative thinking.  The model, which was supported by the
evaluation of the Eye-jump prototype by 118 primary school
children, also functions as a conceptual framework for designers
of interactive museum exhibits that stimulate creativity in
children.
In the following section, we examine the process that produced
these doctoral project results through an interview between the
supervisor, Scrivener, and the student, Zheng.[11]
        7.2 narrating the research process 
Stephen Scrivener (SS):  Can you say something about how
your project developed?
Su Zheng (SZ):  The initial schedule included literature reviews
of museology and the application of interactive media in
museums, and observational studies in museums.  All of these
were designed to identify problems with current design
approaches.  The intention was to develop a new way of
designing to enhance children’s learning in the museum setting. 
However, this approach to research presented a number of
challenges, as the experience of undertaking the initial research
led to a loss of direction due to the sheer quantity of new
information that did not seem to connect together.  Therefore,
the problem to be solved proved very difficult to identify.  As a
result, the initial research then shifted focus to the problems with
the interactive exhibits themselves, which appeared to be mainly
those of technological failures and non-intuitive interfaces.  The
challenge then became to consider how they could be improved
or fixed.  Several design ideas were generated but the results
were not satisfactory, primarily because merely making
improvements to the user interface was not satisfying to me as a
designer.
SS:  Can you say why you found the prospect of resolving or
refining existing problematic situations unsatisfactory?
SZ:  As a designer, the ultimate excitement is to create
something new, to introduce a new perspective on an object or
habitual behavior.  Hopefully you can make a contribution
towards transforming the way we think about our world.[12] 
Hence, in my case, making modest refinements that produce
small improvements to existing interactive exhibits did not
provide sufficient motivation to drive the research forward.  In my
opinion, designers need to be emotional and passionate in order
to create designs that achieve such a connection.  Emotional
commitment should be embraced and regarded as a valuable
asset for the designer.[13]
SS:  How then did you steer the research in a direction that
connected more strongly with your personal motivation as a
designer?
SZ:  In order to re-direct the study, a question came to mind: 
What are the options if I discard the current design research
approach?  The question led to a set of design objectivities based
on an appreciation of surprising design:  I should produce a
design that exemplifies an original idea and provides a unique
experience; is fun and playful; is intuitive for children to use; and
motivates children’s learning.  These were the only foundational
objectives that I set myself.  The intention was to leave enough
space and freedom to explore design opportunities.
The design process was guided by the belief that many good
ideas are inspired by events and interactions with the ordinary
objects that we encounter in our everyday lives.  These objects
provide experiences that are genuinely meaningful and resonate
directly with the general public.  This belief was reinforced by an
exhibit I saw at ARS Electronica, Linz, Austria, called “Tool’s Life”,
which helped me to appreciate the potential of surprise and
surprising artifacts.  
Figure 3. Interacting with “Tool’s Life”
SS:  All of this suggests that you redirected your attention to
emphasize designing as a way of asking and responding to
questions, and that at this stage you had developed a
commitment to the potential of making the familiar unfamiliar, so
as to produce surprising artifacts?
SZ:  Yes, a creative idea doesn’t have to be complicated or
technologically advanced.  It can be delivered by a humble
everyday object that people take for granted.  In the case of the
exhibit above (Figure 3), narratives were created through knifes
and forks on a dining table.  The new interpretation of the
relationship between these everyday objects motivates the user
to explore them further.
A “wow” factor or surprising event can be simply interpreted as
something that people have not seen before and that runs
contrary to what they believe or expect will occur.  This
appreciation directed the research towards the phenomenon of
surprise, with the additional expectation that inspiration could
also be gained from studying another master of surprise:  the
magician and illusionist.  The prospect of discovering “what might
be” by combining the techniques of magic with appropriate digital
technology was compelling.
SS:  So you were undertaking observations and exploring
relevant theory, but this was directed to moving the design
process forward rather than seeking to obtain a systematic
understanding of a given problem and the knowledge domains
relevant to it?
SZ:  Yes, and at this point in the research a discovery was made
while experimenting with the techniques of magic, i.e., the
persistence of vision.  A few ideas were generated, which were
based on this phenomenon:  an image was projected on a fan, a
vibrating string, a waving rod and a ribbon. 
 
a) the string concept              b) the rod concept         c) the ribbon
concept
Figure 4. Experimental design idea
However, there were problems with each of these ideas as they
presented health and safety risks for children.  Furthermore, they
lacked an intuitive connection to familiar experience.  Eventually,
following a series of dead ends, the idea of using a simple
skipping rope as a visual display was identified for further
development as it most elegantly satisfied the original design
criteria.
SS:  But how does the idea of a skipping rope satisfy the criterion
of motivating children’s learning?
SZ:  The skipping rope does not at first sight appear to have a
strong, if any, connection with children’s learning.  However, the
proposition was made that if an ordinary object could suddenly
produce a wow factor (surprise), then there was a strong
possibility that it could help children change the way they think
about how things work because their relationship to everyday
experience would have changed dramatically.  To discover new
possibilities in a familiar object is likely to be a positive learning
process because it stimulates inquiry that results in new
knowledge of the object itself and its structural relationship to
everything else.  With these thoughts in mind, the Eye-jump
concept—the skipping rope that functions as an image display—
was selected for further development.
SS: You talk about believing that Eye-jump could function as an
aid to learning, but isn’t it a risky strategy to draw on beliefs that
you may not be able to provide any reasons for holding?
SZ:  Although I could not offer a deductive or inductive argument
for the conclusion that Eye-jump would help children’s learning, I
had a strong hunch that it at least could provide a new
perspective for children’s learning processes.
SS:  So the major personal achievement at this point was that
you had developed a novel design concept, which you had some
grounds for believing had the potential to stimulate children’s
learning.  How did you go about confirming the anticipated
cognitive value of the device and understanding how that value
could be explained?
SZ:  The idea of backing up my claims for the value of the Eye-
jump device was daunting, given that I had not yet uncovered
any theories that might support my claim, which also implied an
interdisciplinary perspective, i.e., physics, developmental
psychology, museum studies, and interactive media design.  It
was at this point that I began to focus much more on ”why”
questions.  This questioning, sometimes presented by supervisors
and others, proved very helpful in articulating the fields of inquiry
that should be examined with a view to uncovering knowledge
that would be helpful in refining an explanation.  They identified
exegetic elements that needed to be supported by understanding,
e.g., child development, museology, and educational research. 
Initially, questions could only be answered as propositions, but
following examination and interpretation of prior knowledge,
answers could be supported with reasons grounded in this
understanding.  The attempt to understand and explain the
potential of the Eye-jump device required connections to be made
between seemingly unrelated theories.
SS:  In other words, although you had engaged with much of this
material at the early stages of the research in a broad and
superficial manner, it was only after the design had been
produced that a focused search was undertaken.  Furthermore,
was this task undertaken primarily as a means of explaining the
value of the device beyond that of a child’s novelty toy?
SZ:  Yes.
8. Describing the Eye-jump project process 
It is evident from this account of the Eye-jump project process
that we are not dealing with a problem-solving project as
described in section 5, above.  In the first place, the process is
not driven by the identification or elaboration of a problem
observed in a given situation or class of situation, as is the case
in the example provided in section 5.  Here the task appears to be
driven by a set of loosely related ideas selected under the
operation of a personal belief system and for their ability to
engage the researcher’s motivation, commitment, and emotional
engagement.  Also evident in the narrative is a resistance to
being narrowed down to a particular problem for analysis,
interpretation and resolution (Figure 5, below).  We can also see
that, perhaps due to personal beliefs, interests, and motivations,
the researcher’s preference was to move this rather loose nexus
of interests and concerns forward through a process of design
ideation and assessment.  In this particular project, the Eye-jump
concept emerged at a relatively early stage in the process
(represented in Figure 5 by the red dot) and its novelty was
recognized by all concerned.
Figure 5.  The Eye-jump project research process
However, what was not clear at this point was what constituted
this novelty and how it addressed the initial intention of the
research, which was “to develop a new way of designing to
enhance children’s learning in the museum setting.”  In other
words, and consistent with Scrivener’s[14] proposition that
artistic design research is directed toward the production of novel
apprehension, the Eye-jump concept presented a surprising
artifact that remained to be fully understood.
The process of understanding was driven by a demand for
explanation of why and how this novel artifact fulfilled the
research ambition of the project.  (See in Figure 5, above,
“reflecting and understanding of potential.”)  Finding such
explanations required intense engagement, with prior
understanding in a number of different fields, all of which are
implicit in the research aim and criteria outlined above in section
7.  However, in contrast to the function of the literature review in
most conventional research approaches, including problem-
solving design research, this was not done in order to identify a
question or problem worthy of subsequent research but to
account for a novel design solution.
This accounting for the surprising artifact enabled a theory to be
constructed that drew upon prior understanding of cognitive
surprise, cognitive development, learning, and creativity.  The
behavioral and cognitive affects and effects of engagement with
the device were then experimentally tested, and the theory was
used to produce a framework of principles and criteria that other
designers might employ to construct surprising artifacts.  Overall,
the process contributed to an expanded understanding of design
thinking and making.  What remains to be considered are the
specifically artistic features of this process as compared to
problem-solving design research.  This is what we will now turn
to in the following section.
9. Comparing the problem-solving and Eye-jump processes
The first point to note is that both the typical problem-solving
process and the process characterized by the Eye-jump are
directed toward realizing desirable change in the designed world. 
However, problem-solving design research begins with an
undesirable situation in the designed world that prompts
reflection, such as, “Why does this design not do what it ought to
do?”  That is to say, the process begins with the recognition that
there is something to be known.  In contrast, the Eye-jump story
begins with making and thinking that is not attached to a specific
instance of uncertainty and reflection.  Rather, the initial making
and thinking in the Eye-jump process created a surprising and
desirable artefactual situation.  Additionally, in the problem-
solving process, a theory explaining how to enhance the
undesirable situation is postulated, and only when this is in mind
does the process of making begin.  In the Eye-jump project, a
theory explaining the potential application of the surprising
situation was proposed after the situation had been realized. 
Finally, in the problem-solving process, a theory of the problem is
transformed into a theory of its solution, which is then affirmed
through the testing of a new design, whereas in the Eye-jump
project it was the potential of the surprising situation that was
uncovered and evaluated.  However, overall, both processes
appear to achieve the same outcome, that is, a new way of
designing.  So do these differences matter?
When we confront an undesirable artefactual situation, we are
aware of something that fails to meet our desire.  In other words,
there is a cognitive interest, goal, or aim that the situation fails to
live up to.  This gap between the world as it is and the world as
we desire it to be is registered negatively; it stands as the mark
of the fact that the artefactual world is less than our ideas tell us
it should be.  Whatever we do to close this gap amounts to the
satisfaction of ideas that we already possess; it is a matter of
making our ideas work as we want them to.  Under these
circumstances, our design acts are constrained within the bounds
of our present ideas.  It is this kind of situation that is perhaps
reflected in Zheng’s discontent that “merely making
improvements to the user interface was not satisfying to me as a
designer.”
As we have seen in the process described in section 8, the search
for problems, whether through empirical observation or the
critical analysis of prior understanding, is eschewed.  Instead, the
researcher focused on design ideation guided by a set of
unarticulated associations.  The result was the creation of an
artifact that most people recognize as pleasingly surprising.  If we
consider a successful outcome of the problem-solving design
research process, then we would expect it to register satisfaction,
even pleasure, in the viewer or user.  However, we would argue
that it would not register surprise.  Rather, the artifact will be
experienced as familiar, even obvious; something that we knew
was possible even if we weren’t aware of this understanding prior
to the experience.  Cognitive surprise, on the other hand, is
accompanied by confusion and uncertainty because we find
ourselves in the midst of an experience that is outside of our
immediate comprehension.  When cognitive surprise is registered
as desirable or pleasurable, we can say that the experience
stands as the mark of the fact that the artefactual world is more
than our ideas tell us it ought to be.  In short, our ideas have to
catch up with our experience.
This implies that, in order to create desirable and surprising
artifacts, it is necessary to develop techniques that detach the
maker from familiar ideas and the habits of design thinking and
making that are guided by those ideas.  The ties between prior
knowledge and experience need to be loosened in both thinking
and making in order for them to have a projective character.  It is
the will and capacity to develop means that produce surprising
and desirable artifacts that we understand as artistic.  In section
3 we argued that problem-solving research sits more comfortably
with engineering design as a mode of research than it does with
artistic design research.  We can now postulate that this uneasy
fit arises out of the latter’s inclination toward projective making
and thinking, which benefits from a strong element of creative
intuition.  Hence, the coupling of the notion of artistic design with
that of research may be understood as the artification of design
research.
10. Artified design research, and artification in general 
We have described, then, how the introduction of projective
artistic design making and thinking can be understood as artifying
research.  In this section, we want to consider the relevance of
this mode of innovation to non-research practices and the kinds
of knowledge domains discussed in the artification literature. 
What we hope to show is that artistic design, when understood as
projective in the sense elaborated here, cannot be interpreted
through the two highly influential theories of professional
practice:  Herbert Simon’s sciences of the artificial and Donald
Schön’s reflective practice.  While the work of these two scholars
contributes to the ideas and methods at work today in the
professions, we hope to show that projective practice offers
something beyond them.
If technology- and engineering-led design found inspiration for
the development of models of scientific and rational design and
design research in the writing of Herbert Simon,[15] then artistic
designers found encouragement in Donald Schön’s theory of
reflective practice.[16]  Schön begins The Reflective Practitioner:
How Professionals Think in Action by observing that “The
professions have become essential to the very functioning of our
society….We look to professionals for the definition and solution of
our problems, and it is through them that we strive for social
progress.”[17]  Nevertheless, Schön goes on to argue that at the
same time that they recognized their indispensability, the
professions experienced a crisis of confidence that hinged
“centrally on the question of professional knowledge.  Is
professional knowledge adequate to fulfill the espoused purposes
of the professions?  Is it sufficient to meet the societal demands
which the professions have helped to create?”[18]  From the
literature on artification, it would appear that it is the professions
that are turning to art and design for inspiration, perhaps in the
belief that these domains have something to offer that will help
them to meet societal demands and maintain confidence in
professional competence.
Schön was critical of the professions’ ability to solve the observed
crisis because “We are bound to an epistemology of practice
which leaves us at a loss to explain, or even to describe, the
competences to which we now give overriding importance.”[19] 
The epistemology he refers to here is that of technical rationality,
“the view of professional knowledge which has most powerfully
shaped both our thinking about the professions and the
institutional relations of research, education, and practice –
professional activity consists in instrumental problem solving
made rigorous by the application of scientific theory and
technique.”[20]
Given that the crisis of confidence experienced by the professions
was first described by Simon, it is reasonable to assume that the
education of professionals was subsequently brought under a
stronger regime of technical rationality, in which knowledge is
understood as structured according to a hierarchy of the basic,
the applied, and the situational.  The engineering or problem-
solving design research model described earlier adheres to a
technical rationalist epistemology of professional knowledge, and,
as we have seen, such thinking cannot account for the process
described in sections 7 through 9.  This being the case, we are left
to consider the possibility that by using Schon’s theory of
reflective practice, the  response to this crisis of professional
confidence might be seen as a something else than what there is
already in the area or activity to be artified.
Although both Simon’s and Schön’s scholarship in this field sought
to provide a solution to the crisis of professional confidence,
Simon kept faith with technical rationality, whereas Schön was
highly critical of its limitations.  In everyday action, he argued,
our knowledge is ordinarily tacit, implicit in our patterns of action
and in our feel for the stuff with which we are dealing.  Our
knowing is in action.  Similarly, the professional depends on tacit
knowing-in-action.  Nevertheless, we often think about what we
are doing, and usually reflection on knowing-in-action goes
together with reflection on the stuff at hand.  When the
professional reflects on knowing-in-action, he reflects on the
understanding that has been implicit in his action; understanding
that he surfaces, criticizes, restructures, and embodies in further
action.  According to Schön, “It is this entire process of reflection-
in-action which is central to the ‘art’ by which practitioners
sometimes deal well with situations of uncertainty, instability,
uniqueness, and value conflict.”[21]
In the Reflective Practioner, Schön articulated the gap between
how we think about and theorize practitioner competence and the
realities of practice.  According to Schön, in practice, professionals
function as reflective practitioners rather than as rational problem
solvers.  Since its publication in 1983, many professions have
taken and built upon the ideas articulated in The Reflective
Practitioner to invigorate professional education, training, and
practice.  If it is reasonable to suppose that the domains to be
artified now comprise skilled problem solvers and reflective
practitioners, then this suggests that reflective practice is not the
key “something else” that is sought from art.  Hence, if we are to
show that projective making and thinking is one kind of
“something else” that non-art fields are seeking, we need to
provide grounds for believing that this mode of practice cannot be
interpreted as reflective practice.
Schön’s primary insights were that, in practice, ends are not
known and cannot be known in advance because every practice
situation is unique and practitioners draw heavily on tacit
knowledge and appreciations acquired over years of practice to
deal with the uniqueness of each new task.  In short, Schön took
the practice situation as given and focused first on how the
practitioner comes to understand the uniqueness of a particular
situation through the surfacing and theorizing of the failure of
practitioner knowledge and, second, how that knowledge is
expanded to satisfy the demands of the situation at hand.
Therefore, whether we are talking about rational problem solving
or reflective practice, at some point we are confronted by a
particular situation that we find undesirable and our goal is to
eradicate or ameliorate that dissatisfaction.  What the two
approaches offer are different ways of dealing with situational
problems and different ways of marshaling prior skills, knowledge,
and understanding so as to resolve them.  However, does Schön’s
theory of reflective practice explain how we can step out of  the
artefactual world as it presents itself to us, and out of our
habitual practices of production and thought, to create possible
artefactual worlds that register desirable surprise?
Schön argued that two variables, consequences in relation to
intention and desirability of all perceived consequences, intended
or unintended, combine to constitute four conditions for
reflection:  undesirable surprise; desirable or neutral surprise; no
surprise that is desirable or neutral; and no surprise that is
undesirable.  Both undesirable conditions demand reflection,
whereas the desirable conditions can be passed over without
reflection, regardless of whether or not they are accompanied by
surprise. Schön explained the response to desirable surprise as
follows:
In the second case [desirable surprise], the inquirer’s
expectation is disappointed but the consequences taken as
a whole are considered desirable.  The associated theory is
refuted but the move is affirmed…. According to the logic of
affirmation, the move has succeeded…she [the inquirer]
need not reflect on it….[22]
In the theory of reflective practice, the logic of affirmation has
priority over that of confirmation.  “In the practice context,
priority is placed on the interest in change and therefore on the
logic of affirmation.”[23]  What this means is that as long as a
move is judged desirable, it is affirmed regardless of whether or
not the element of surprise is present.  In short, all actions are
viewed as determined by and measured against intentions, which
are viewed as being largely tacit until reflection brings them to
the surface.  In short, reflective practice is bounded by prior
knowledge and present conditions; prior habits may be adjusted,
but only so far as is necessary to accommodate the occurrence of
undesirable outcomes of design moves intended to resolve the
given situation.  Consequently, Schön’s theory of reflective
practice does not appear to explain how we can step out of the
artefactual world as it presents itself to us, and out of our
habitual practices of production and thought, so as to create
possible artefactual worlds that register desirable surprise.  Both
problem-solving design and reflective practice tend to reduce
ambition to questions such as, “How can the world be made to be
better than it currently is?”  In contrast, projective thinking and
making supports questions of the form “What kind of world can
be made?”
Since the turn of the nineteenth century, artistic designers and
artists have devised a host of methods designed to disrupt
familiar ways of working and thinking artistically, which include
new conceptual and material techniques of production, and the
appropriation of non-art materials, objects, practices, and
theories, in the constant re-negotiation of what we understand as
the work and works of art.  One such strategy is the appropriation
of, or relocation into, research practices from related or distant
fields, as was the case for Zheng, whose practice was disrupted
by the need to negotiate the methods and means of a problem-
solving approach to design research.  Such practices loosen the
connection between the practitioner and his or her habitual
modes of doing and thinking;  it is perhaps these practices that
non-art fields recognize and that we have sought to illustrate
through our account of the artification of research as one kind of
“something else” that artified domains didn’t have before
artification.
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